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have been fulfilled he holds a fee that is subject only to persons under
a legal disability and further that such persons have one year after
the removal of the disability to redeem the land. If such persons, after
the removal of the disability, recover the land the purchaser receives
the value of all the improvements and the amount of the taxes with
interest at 15 per cent. If, however, the person holds under a tax deed
that is fair on its face but nevertheless some statutory requirement is
missing the claimant may hold the land for five years and by taking
advantage of the short statute of limitations defeat any action brought
by the previous owners for the recovery of the land. If the person
bringing the action is successful, the purchaser receives the value of all
taxes, costs, penalties and improvements as ascertained by the jury
trying the action with interest at 12 per cent. 24 If the purchaser is
defeased at any time after his purchase these above sections give him
his investment back with a fine rate of interest.
The procedure for obtaining land in this method is obviously fraught
with many legal pitfalls, many beyond the control of the purchaser,
but if his investment is not too large and he exercises and causes the
county treasurer to exercise as much care as possible in following the
statutory conditions there seems no reason why a purchaser may not obtain a title to land that would be indefeasible as to all but those under
a legal disability. Such a risk seems to be reasonable particularly in
days of such severe tax schedules especially when viewed in the light
that if the land is redeemed by any one at any time the investment
draws more interest than that which is possible to receive in any corresponding business investment today.
Francis . Paulson.
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COLLATERAL

REVIEW OF

CONVICTIONS

IN FEDERAL CouRTs-By

Alexander Holtzoff, Boston University Law Review, January, 1945.The conventional concept of an appellate review of a trial court judgment of conviction involves a reconsideration of the case by an appellate
of conviction involves a reconsideration of the case by an appellate
tribunal solely on the trial court record. Under existing criminal procedure in the Federal courts, the defendant must move for an appeal
within five days after entry of judgment of conviction; otherwise direct
review of his case is forever barred.
24

1937.

Chapter 142, Sec. 262 Colorado Statutes Annotated, 1935 as amended in
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The form of collateral review dealt with in this article consists in the
marked expansion of the scope of the writ of habeas corpus. The limits
of this expansion are well-defined by abundant citations to Federal decisions, but the need for brevity precludes their being individually detailed here. The author reminds us of the oft-forgotten fact that the
writ of habeas corpus in its original form only had to do with facilitating
the liberation of persons imprisoned without sufficient cause. As a matter of fact, the celebrated English Habeas Corpus Act did not contemplate the use of this high prerogative writ for the freeing of persons
incarcerated pursuant to a conviction and judgment. On the contrary,
it expressly excluded from its operation persons who were confined by
reason of a conviction of a crime.
In any event, the underlying legal principle to be extracted from the
many cases cited by the author is that the jurisdiction of the trial court
is the only issue that may be litigated when resort is had to a writ of
habeas corpus to attack a conviction in a criminal case. Thus it appears
that the so-called enlargement of the writ with which we are now dealing is in truth an enlargement of the judicial construction of the term
jurisdiction, as it has been formulated over the years in the Federal
courts.
From his examination of the authorities, the author concludes that
in the following instances a convicted defendant can collaterally attack
his conviction by a habeas corpus proceeding in a Federal court of appellate jurisdiction:
1. Where the trial court lacks jurisdiction of the offense.
2. Where the court lacks jurisdiction of the person.
3. Where the statute pursuant to which the defendant is prosecuted
is unconstitutional.
4. Where the indictment attempts to charge an offense unknown
to or not cognizable under any Act of Congress.
5. Where defendant is prosecuted by information when he was entitled to prosecution by indictment.
6. Where defendant was tried without a jury, and it appears that
his right thereto was not waived.
7. Where defendant alleges that he was not accorded the right of
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
8. Where defendant alleges that he was induced to plead guilty by
misrepresentations or threats and coercion.
9. Where defendant alleges that he was mentally incompetent,
either by reason of insanity or influence of drugs, when he pleaded guilty.
10. Where defendant alleges that he was convicted on the basis of
perjured evidence, mob influence or a generally hostile atttitude
of those conducting the trial.
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Since the courts still reiterate that jurisdiction is the sole test in
determining the propriety of the writ in criminal cases, it necessarily
follows, the author concludes, that each of the foregoing objections, if
sustained on the facts, constitute jurisdictional defects. He observes
that some of them preclude jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, while others cause jurisdiction to be lost or divested in the
course of the proceeding.
On the other hand, the following objections are not open for consideration in a habeas corpus proceeding, in as much as they are not
regarded by the courts as affecting jurisdiction:
1. That the indictment is defective or insufficient.
2. That evidence was introduced at the trial in violation of the provision of the Fourth Amendment proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures, or reception of evidence in contravention of the
privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment. It is interesting to note in this regard that the mere
fact that a constitutional guaranty has been violated at the trial
does not ipso facto permit a review by habeas corpus.
3. That the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.
4. That the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal.
5. That the court made erroneous rulings in respect to reception or
exclusion of evidence during the trial.
6. That the court committed error in its charge to the jury.
It should be observed that the use of the writ of habeas corpus as
developed in this paper is not limited to the review of convictions in
Federal courts. On the contrary, the grounds for invoking habeas corpus
herein set out would apply with equal weight to persons imprisoned in
state institutions, as the Federal courts are petitioned on the theory
that the state court judgment is invalid because obtained in violation
of the procedural guarantees found in the Fourteenth Amendment.
By way of conclusion, the author states that the nature of the collateral attack on judgments by habeas corpus differs radically from
that of the conventional appellate review in the following particulars:
1. There is no time limit within which a petition of a writ of
habeas corpus must be filed; action may be instituted at any
time while the defendant is in prison, whereas an appeal must
be taken within five days under present Federal procedure.
2. The review on habeas corpus is not limited to the record of the
trial court, as is the case with appellate review; evidence dehors
the record is admissible.
3. The decision in a habeas corpus proceeding is not res judicata
on the point determined, and so does not constitute a bar to a
new proceeding looking to the same relief.
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The defendant need not raise all his objections in the same petition, but may bring up various matters at different times in different proceedings.
From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that the author brings
into sharp focus the many distinctions obtaining between direct appeal and collateral attack by habeas corpus in reviewing convictions in
federal courts.
4.

David S. Landis.

PARTNERSHIPS IN TAX AVOIDANCE - By Randolph Paul. George
Washington Law Review. February, 1945.-Partnershipsin Tax Avoidance points up a current problem that is of equal interest to the Treasury Department as it is to the average lawyer or his client. Due mainly
to the tremendous need for monies which in turn has started the tax ball
rolling, men in business are plumbing all the possibilities that the law
allows.
Where once the cases were hard to find now a great share of the tax
litigation concerns itself with this type of entity. As pointed out the
Internal Revenue code requires partnerships to file a return which in
itself is non-taxable since it is merely an information return for the purpose of showing only the distributive shares.
The early cases in partnership were somewhat incidental to other
problems but now appear to be a real problem in themselves. The rule
major of the present discussion is: "Income is taxable to the person who
earns it ... A mere assignment of income, does not transfer liability for
tax upon the income from assignor to assignee. An assignment of capital
which produces income will transfer liability for tax upon the income
from assignor to assignee." However Paul admonishes: "There must be
a complete transfer divesting the assignor of the substantial attributes
of ownership namely, domination and control, as well as the mere technical forms of ownership."
Here then is stated the sineque non of partnerships between husband
and wife and it is about the above quotes that all the litgation swirls.
Since local law may not determine what the Federal law wants, the
capacity for man and wife to become partners is strictly a federal question. In so many of the cases treated in this article there is an assignment from husband to wife of an equity in a business and they proceed
to file a partnership return ... when the Bureau questions the returns
they will find that there is not an assignment of capital but of income
since the wife or other near relative does nothing to warrant the remuneration. Thus in looking behind the scenes many cases of pseudopartnership are uncovered which the bureau has-to eliminate.
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The definition accepted in Meehan v. Valentine is concluded to be
the best: "Requisites are... that the parties must have joined together
to carry on a trade or adventure for their common benefit, each contributing property or services, and having a community of interest in
the profits." "The common practice then of merely citing the wife as a
partner sometimes without her knowledge is prima facie contrary to the
definition."
Subterfuges of many kinds exist and are especially suspect when
they follow a dissolution of a corporation. In all cases where there is
personal service involved it has been held that partnerships cannot be
sustained. However, in the business field, manufacturing, etc., it has
been frequently held that an assignment to the wife coupled with a reassignment to the business constitutes a bona fide partnership within
the meaning of the Code. The participation angle is very important
whether it be capital or services. Where only the husband's skill or
special knowledge makes a concern run you will find no partnership
held for obvious reasons.
Regarding the contribution of capital to the business: the wife
must show the source and bookkeeping entries are closely checked, as
well as other evidential prying, so it's pretty hard to get away with
something less than a legal situation. One other unusual type has cropped
up recently and that is the wife and children partnership. Held valid
in quite a few cases, it generally must have the wife hold in trust the
childrens' shares in the business. Thus it would seem that the right of
the taxpayer to avoid taxes is not hampered too much by some rulings
of the Tax Board in this regard.
Finally if you wish to avail yourself of an instrument of this type
watch out for these things: avoid ambiguous conduct, and agreements
of like nature; don't make the motive too obvious since in a close situation it won't help, and when in the final analysis you find the change
was made so dominion could stay and tax liability move out, you are
in a bad spot. Better legislation would help but this can only be
achieved after the Treasury Department has executed a format readily
acceptable to the hunter and the hunted.
John D. O'Neill.

PERSONAL PROPERTY TAxEs ON VESSELS REGULARLY ENGAGED IN
INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN CommERcE-By John Ambler, Washington
Law Review, January, 1945.-In this article the author presents the
problem of imposing personal property taxes on vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. In covering this field the author sets forth
two basic questions that are to be answered.
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The first question to be discussed is the location of the suurce where
the vessels are taxable. The author first brings out the old "home port"
theory. This theory was that the vessels were taxable wherever they
were registered and this was considered their home port. This theory has
long since been overruled. The present theory which is followed by the
courts is that the vessels are taxable at the place of residence of the
owner or owners of the vessel. The author then cites a number of cases
from which the following rules of personal property taxation are established.
1. A vessel regularly engaged in foreign commerce between ports
in the United States and ports abroad is taxable only in the domicile
of its owner.
2. The same rule applies to vessels regularly engaged in interstate
commerce.
3. An exception is recognized when the vessel is wholly employed
within the limits of the taxing state. If so, then irrespective of residence
of ownership elsewhere, it is taxable by the state within whose limits
it is so engaged.
4. The home port of the vessel is immaterial to the question of the
tax situs.
S. The fact that a "business domicile" or "business situs" has been
established by the owner of such vessels in a state other than the
domicile of the owners, appears to be immaterial on the subject of their
taxation situs.
6. Failure of the inability of the vessels to enter physically the
domicile of the owner is immaterial on taxation at such domicile.
In summation to the first question, the author states that the vessels
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce are to be taxed only in the
state where the-owner or owners are residents.
The second question presented has to do with the amount the vessels
are taxed. In the answering of this question the author shows the
tendency of the Pacific Coast states to reduce the personal property
taxes to the level where they would attract the owners of shipping lines
to establish their residence within the state. To achieve this goal California, Oregon, and Washington have amended their constitutions so
as to exempt all vessels from all taxation except those for state purposes.
The author in conclusion of his article believes that the trend of reduced taxes on vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce will
be continued and reduced to a further extent.
Arthur A. May.
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STATE AND LocAL TAXATION ON FEDERAL PROPERTY-By Roy G.

Blakey. Tennessee Law Review, February, 1945.-In this article we
see again the never ending conflict between state and federal government in the United States. The author explains that the proposition that
neither the national nor the state government may tax each other's instrumentalities and employees has grown into a confusing body of legal
principles. New Deal projects and the war have made the problem more
acute. Mr. Blakey tells us that over 24% of all the land in the United
States is owned by the federal government.
The Federal Real Estate Board classifies the property in the following categories: (1) Real estate used for the care of wards of the government. (2) Real estate used for the general administration of the government. (3) Real estate used for national defense. (4) Real estate
used for the development and protection of commerce. (5) Real estate
used for land utilization and conservation projects. (6) Real estate
used for welfare programs. (7) Conservation and utilization Qf water
resources. (8) Surplus property no longer needed by the government.
The New Deal projects which were primarily designed to stimulate
employment were located in cities, yet the local units of- government
could not tax them for local upkeep. They could, however, make a
charge for such services as fire and police protection. The 1937 Federal
Housing Act made a provision for payment in lieu of taxes to local
units. Another type of New Deal land acquisition was for irrigation
flood control, power development, etc. The legislation authorizing each
project defined the payment in lieu of taxes. The author points out
the inadequacy of these payments, using the T.V.A. for an example.
War purchases of property by the government also left local units
of government with decreasing taxable real estate. The government housing projects contributed their share. Finally to help find a solution for
the growing problem the Federal Real Estate Board was established.
Other studies of the problem have been made by the President's Special
Committee of the National Emergency Council, the Municipal Law
Officers, and the Congressional Joint Committee on Reduction of Unnecessary Federal Expenditures. Recently more favorable federal legislation has been passed regarding "in lieu" payment on tax free federal
property, but the problem still is acute.
The author concludes by making several recommendations, including a suggestion for a standing Congressional committee to represent
state and local government interest. This article points up the necessity
for cooperation. Neither the Federal nor the State Governments can
do the job alone; they must work together. Just how far each should
go is not answered here, but the question raised deserves serious
thought.
Arthur M. Diamond.
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THE RIGHT OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS TO PREVENT THE
SOLUTION OF A PROFITABLE ENTERPRIsE-By

Dis-

Robert A. Sprecher. Ken-

tucky Law Journal. March, 1945.--The question presented in this article, though it may seem highly academic to some people and one which
would not too often present itself to the courts, is in reality a very
down to earth proposition which is recurring in our courts constantly.
Some may cast this problem aside without a second thought by saying,
"How can the minority stockholders prevent anything which has to do
with the corporation." In answer to these the author here has made a
very comprehensive study of the cases in the various jurisdictions and
has endeavored to develop the general rules as they prevail.
The author, at the outset, sets out the fact that the rights of the
minority stockholders depend upon the determination of the dividing
line between two fundamental rules of corporate law. Rule one is that
the majority of stockholders of a corporation are entrusted with the
matters of important corporate policy, - not a court at the insistance
of a minority stockholder. Rule two is that the relationship between the
majority and minority stockholder is fiduciary in nature, and as such
the minority stockholder may veto or object to the acts of the majority
stockholder if the acts objected to constitute a breach of the fiduciary
relation. The author to top off the presentation of these two rules goes
on to say that the dividing line between the two has been and is a
wavering one with the various courts granting decisions to both parties
at different times.
After having laid down this basic groundwork the author goes on
to aver certain fundamental rules of corporation law. He mentions the
right of the majority of stockholders to dissolve an insolvent or unprofitable business, whether provided for by statute or not. He then
goes to the other side of the fence by showing that minority stockholders
can enjoin any majority action that is fraudulent, illegal, or ultra vires.
Having spoken of these basic problems which do not bear strictly
upon the problem at hand, the author moves on to speak of fiduciary
relationship between the majority and the minority stockholder. This
relationship arises only when a majority stockholder steps out of his
role as a stockholder and takes up the business of managing or conducting the corporation without regard to the interests of the corporation or the minority stockholders. At this point the author goes on to
pose hypothetical cases on the proposition just stated and the views
that some courts have taken on the subject.
In the second part of this treatise, the author speaks of the rights
of minority stockholders in dissolution cases generally. Although the
coverage of the various jurisdictions is not complete in the sense that
all of the various states are not represented, a greater majority of the
states are covered and the cases cited are the law and many of the citations are to fairly recent decisions. The jurisdictions covered are as fol-
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lows: Alabama, California, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Texas, and Washington.
The final part of the article is what is labeled by the author as the
conclusion. He concludes from the vast materials cited, that the courts
will permit majority stockholders to dissolve profitable corporations according to statute and that the prevention of such dissolutions by
minority stockholders is limited to but four situations, namely: (1)
Where there is fraud, (2) where there is a "freezing out" of minority
holders for the purpose of continuing the business for the benefit of the
majority holders, (3) where the dissolution is, in effect a consolidation
of two or more corporations, with such consolidation being contrary to
law, and (4) where there is a sale of assets to the majority holders for
an inadequate price. In view of this conclusion the author has pointed
out a situation where the minority holders do have recourse to legal
proceedings to prevent the dissolution of a profitable enterprise and
this article may well be considered very timely in view of the fact that
at the present time there may be many corporations which are profitable
which may wish to dissolve in view of the fact that they will no longer
be going concerns when their government contracts expire with the
successful completion of the war.
Norbert S. Wleklinski.

TORT LIABILITY OF A SOLDIER-By J. D. Mann. Indiana Law Journal, January, 1945.-The ever present although the rather hypothetical
dilemma that confronts members of our armed forces as to tort liability
when acting in obedience to orders is the subject of Lt. Mann's article
appearing in the January edition of the Indiana Law Journal. Mann,
a lieutenant in the Army, treats the subject not only from the American
viewpoint but also briefly touches upon the English view. The prevailing authoritative view in England is that a soldier does not lose his civil
rights or discard his civil liability by becoming a member of the armed
forces. By so doing he not only becomes subject to the regular civil
law but also to a code of military law contained in the Army Act, the
King's Regulation and Army Orders. Lt. Mann points out that the rule
is similar in the United States.
Although the majority rule in this country aligns itself with the rule
propounded by the English lawmakers there is a conflict of authority
in this country. One line of reasoning takes the rule and modifies it to
cover the soldier acting in obedience to orders from civil liability unless
such orders are manifestly illegal. The other school would cover the
soldier or subordinate officer with absolute non-liability unless the actor

